We have noted a number of times the on again, off again negotiations between Samsung Electronics and LG Display (LPL) concerning the former’s purchase of OLED panels to begin producing an OLED TV brand.  This would be separate from the QD/OLED TV line that is based on such displays produced by affiliate Samsung Display (pvt) and would have been tiered above the company’s extensive quantum dot LCD TV line and their Mini-LED/QD TV line.  The negotiations have been ongoing for months and our assessment in recent notes indicated that if a deal were not made relatively soon it would become difficult for Samsung to assemble and market such a line before the holidays.
While negotiations seemingly were bogged down on price, with OLED supplier LG Display allegedly offering prices lower that what it receives from parent LG Electronics (066570.KS), Samsung has been said to be driving a very hard price position and with the rapidly falling price of LCD TV panels, it seems the negotiations have broken down again.  A spokesman from Samsung was quoted as saying “If we are to use LG OLED panels in our products this year, the discussion would have to be concluded by now. So chances are slim that we will release TV sets with LG OLEDs.   Still the possibilities remain open for future orders, although nothing is decided.”
As we have noted, with Samsung Display’s decision to end its production of large panel LCD displays, parent Samsung Electronics purchases its LCD displays from a number of panel producers, some of whom it has a financial connection with, such as Chinastar (pvt), owned by TCL (000100.CH), who purchased Samsung Display’s Suzhou LCD fab in August of 2020, with Samsung taking a 12.3% stake in TCL at the time.  Samsung also purchases LCD panels from China’s BOE (200725.CH) and Taiwan-based AU Optronics (2409.TT), among others. 
While the decision to terminate the large panel LCD display production business at Samsung Display was made by the board, we believe, based on the composition of the board, that Samsung Electronics was fully represented and was part of that decision, and while there was certainly some difficulty involved in establishing volume relationships with other suppliers, Samsung Electronics as a whole saw weaker TV set sales but higher profits from Samsung display during panel price increases  and saw the opposite during LCD panel price declines.  As the industry began to transition toward OLED, especially small panel OLED, we believe Samsung management was looking to capitalize on that growth and the long-term decline in LCD panel prices, which stimulate TV sales, without the offset of LCD TV panel losses at Samsung Display. 
The strategy suffered during the COVID-19 LCD TV panel price hike, but has since moved in Samsung’s favor, as in theory, TV set sales should increase as set prices decline, without the offset of large panel LCD losses at Samsung Display.  We note that of the 120 data points in Figure 1, 41.7% have been over the trend line, leaving 58.3% of months below trend, leading to a downward trend.  During the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise in LCD TV panel prices, the spread between LCD TV panel pricing and OLED TV panel pricing shrank, making Samsung more focused on offering OLED TVs to its customer base, but as that spread increased beginning last July, that necessity lessened and Samsung had less pressure to offer OLED TVs and more leverage with its QD/Mini-LED and pure quantum dot TVs, which are both based on LCD panels.  It would seem Samsung believes that scenario will continue through the end of this year and therefore has a greater incentive to lowball LGD for OLED displays and less pressure to come to a deal before the holidays.  We expect that Samsung will be highly promotional in regard to its quantum dot and QD/Mini-LED TVs this holiday season and will have less inclination to negotiate with LG Display until next year.

Considerable talk was generated when China’ largest panel producer BOE exhibited a 95” 8K OLED panel at the SID show last month, giving rise to speculation that BOE intends to both produce that panel commercially and also to produce a line of 4 additional large panel OLED panel sizes starting at 55”.  The panel shown was produced on a pilot line at BOE’s B5 fab, using a WOLED (White OLED) process similar to that used by LG Display and an IGZO backplane.  The pilot line and the remaining B5 fab is set up as a Gen 8.5 line using a half cut process, which means the system can deposit OLED materials on half of the Gen 8.5 sheet and must process the other half separately.  Given that 2 95” panels can be cut from a Gen 8.5 substrate at an efficiency of 90%, the half cut process is ideal for this panel size, but half cut processing is more difficult than the ¼ cut processing used for smaller IT panels and making that transition can bring down yield.  It would seem that BOE has mastered that change, at least on it pilot line, allowing it to produce large OLED panels on a Gen 8 line.
The ability to process ½ cut OLED panels on a full 15,000 sheet/month line, such as exists at the company’s B16 fab in Chengdu, BOE must be able equip the line with ½ cut deposition equipment, which is typically produced by Canon-Tokki (CAJ).   Those tools are both expensive and have an extended lead times, which means ordering the equipment to get into the queue is essential for timely production and the cut status of BOE’s Gen 8.5 lines at either B5 or B16 is unknown.  We estimate that based on a 15,000 sheet line at 100% yield, BOE could produce ~60,000 OLED panels each month, which when using a more realistic yield of 75% becomes ~45,000 units monthly, and we believe that a 75% yield for a new producer and a new process is generous, and while we have already seen headlines predicting the rapid share loss of South Korean OLED producers, we expect the impact of BOE’s push toward large panel OLED commercialization will take some time to materialize.
The good news for BOE is that relatively few OLED TV panels are produced each year, with an expected 10m panels this year, and therefore a relatively small production line will have an impact on share of the market.  That said, we believe the biggest issue facing BOE in this situation is yield, which, at times, has been a limiting factor for LG Display, who has had more experience producing large panel WOLED displays than any other producer, especially when opening a new line or fab.  Producing a few ultra-large panels on a pilot line is one thing but producing high volumes is another and much of BOE’s OLED experience in in small panel OLED production.  As a public company in China, BOE does have to work within certain financial norms, and is expanding its OLED production to meet Apple’s (APPL) needs for small panel OLED displays, while developing production infrastructure for IT OLED products to try to capture Apple’s iPad business in the future.  Running what would likely be a money losing fab for many months puts additional pressure on the company’s profitability, especially during a period when LCD panel prices are declining.  We would expect BOE to sample large panel OLED displays to all of LGD’s customers, and would likely be the lower cost alternative, but both the ability to meet volume targets and reliability of product will take time to become established, so our expectations are that BOE’s impact on the large panel OLED space will be modest this year and will take time to build in 2023.
Based on our calculations, we would expect BOE to be able to produce 473,400 units during the 1st 12 months of production on a 15,000 sheet line, against LGD’s estimated 10m units this year.  Impact yes, ‘glorious revolution’ maybe less so.

​Over the last year or two we have noted that the government of India has been trying to attract display producers to build LCD or OLED production fabs in the country by offering various financial and infrastructure incentives.  While there are a considerable number of companies with high capacity assembly plants in the country, it has been harder to attract actual production fabs as they need a complex infrastructure of suppliers that feed the fab or the cost of transporting raw materials and components offsets much of the value of the incentives.  On 06-25-21 and again on 12/16/21 we noted that the cost of building an assembly line in India was ~60% of that in China, which has gone a long way toward bringing in companies like Foxconn (2354.TT), Wistron (3231.TT), who assemble for Apple (AAPL), and Samsung (005930.KS), whose smartphone assembly plants in India have a capability to produce over 100m smartphones each year.
The chicken and egg issue of a supporting supplier infrastructure is a difficult one for India and one that takes time and money to build, and India is also trying to attract semiconductor companies to the country, so capital has to be carefully allocated, but in our 05/23/22 note we indicated that a subsidiary ((Elest (pvt)) of Rajesh Exports (RJEX.IN), a Bangalore based company that is, according to the company, the largest processor of gold globally and the world’s lowest cost gold jewelers producer, was shopping for a deal under which the company could get funding for the construction of a Gen 6 OLED fab.  It seems that the company and the government of the State of Telangana in Southeast India have signed an MOU for what is expected to be a ~$3b OLED project, along with additional projects to produce lithium ion batteries and electric vehicles.
Our skepticism about the project was based on the lack of any expertise by the company in the display space, particularly relating to OLED, but the company has stated that the technology “…will come from some of the most advanced research centers around the world…” but did not give any specifics on who might be associated with the project, although one positive is the fact that Vendanta (VEDL), an Indian mining company owned by billionaire Anil Agarwal, purchase a controlling stake in display glass producer Avanstrate (pvt) from Carlyle Group (CG) last year with the intent to use the substrate producer as a platform to develop an LCD module factory  in Nagpur. 
We don’t doubt that India wants to become a player in the display production business and is willing to offer capital that would help to attract interested parties, but it is a difficult proposition that requires not only a supply chain, but a considerable amount of experienced display engineers, who would have to come from sources outside of the country.  Attracting that kind of talent is expensive and has proven difficult in the past, but much will depend on what foreign resources Elest is able to tap into.  It would likely be difficult to attract talent from South Korea or Taiwan, but China’s OLED display industry, while still young in itself, would likely be the place where Indian companies might find display companies willing to supply construction and operating management for a price.  Whether this project ever gets off the ground remains to be seen, especially as the agreement is an MOU, but we give it time to see if it can develop into an actual production facility in the future.

Ultra-large TVs are headline producers but not great sellers, but TV panel and set manufacturers continue to push display dimensions higher despite lackluster sales.  While most of these ultra-large sets are more a proof-of-capability, they are fodder for articles and advertisements extoling the expertise of panel and TV set manufacturing.  LG Electronics (066570.KS) promised to ship a 97” OLED TV this year and seems to be getting close to making that promise a reality as the set received certification from South Korea’s National Radio Research Agency, the organization that ensures devices that emit radio waves are compliant with regulations and safe for the public. In South Korea.  While there is no assurance that certification will lead to an imminent product release, it is among the last necessary steps before a product release.  LG would have OLED monitor and TV products ranging from 48” to 97” upon release.
Under the assumption that the 97” 4K OLED sets will be released in LG’s home country of South Korea first, the price of these sets, which are ~4’ x 7’ is expected to be between $23,300 and $25,500, which will likely keep them out of the hands of the average consumer, but they will show up at exhibitions, promotional tours, and major events, although the idea that they will be released in time for the FIFA World Cup in Qatar later this year, with elimination rounds already underway.  Samsung has a 98” QD/Mini-LED TV but it has been rumored to have sold only a few units at the bargain price of $15,000.

​As we have mentioned a number of times in previous notes, Apple has a strong interest in micro- displays, and has been researching the use of same for a potential AR/VR product.  There is considerable competition in the micro-display space, not only between manufacturers, but between types of micro-displays that are vying for the attention of Apple and others, with LCD, OLED, quantum dot, and LED factions all pushing development to garner favor in the AR/VR world.  Of the AR headsets in our database that have been released or announced, for which we have specific display information, 12 of 23 are based on micro-OLED displays, 5 on micro-LCD displays, 3 on micro-LED displays, with 3 (older) based on LCoS or DLP.
Given the ability for OLED displays to be both self-emissive and patterned, they offer a practical solution for micro-displays than less mature and therefore more expensive micro-LED solutions and nascent quantum dot micro-displays, and the weaker characteristics of micro-LCD.  Currently Sony (SNE) is the leader in the micro-OLED display space, having been involved in the development of such products since 2009, originally for the replacement of optical viewfinders.  Currently Sony displays use a WOLED structure with a color filter, similar to what LG Display (LPL) uses for it OLED monitor and TV displays, as patterning micro-OLED pixels, which are an order of magnitude smaller than those in a typical OLED TV display, is quite difficult.
Given the expertise needed to develop micro-OLED displays, there are only a few producers competing with Sony, including AUO (2409.TT) and EverDisplay (688538.CH), but the leader in large OLED displays, LG Display, is said to be at the cusp of ordering deposition equipment from Korea’s Sunic Systems (171090.KS) in order to develop a competitive micro-OLED display line that will compete with Sony for Apple’s potential AR/VR business.  Sunic supplies both cluster and in-line OLED deposition systems designed for both large and small panel production, which include loaders and various chambers for organic and metal deposition, and are sold to many display manufacturers and research organizations and OLED lighting manufacturers. 
While we do not know the exact tools being ordered by LG Display, which would give some indication as to what stage of development the company has reached, we would expect it will take some time for LGD to get qualified as a volume producer and would likely not be in the running for the first Apple AR/VR release, which is rumored for early in 2023, but given LGD’s expertise in the OLED space, we expect they will eventually become a viable competitor, especially given their OLED supply relationship with Apple, for whom they supply a substantial percentage of iPhone displays.  China’s BOE (200725.CH) has also been developing micro-OLED displays using Sunic deposition tools but oriented toward military applications.

​Everydisplay (688538.CH) (aka EDO, aka Hehui Optronics) released 1Q preliminary results and an update on the expansion of its Gen 6 OLED production fab, along with some details on the effect of COVID lockdowns on the company’s financials.  Edo has an operating Gen 4.5 OLED fab and a Gen 6 OLED fab that is currently being expanded from 30,000 sheets/month to what will eventually be 45,000 sheets/month.  Equipment move-ins have been completed and tool optimization is continuing with trial production expected next year (our timeline is July ’23).  The project was financed by investments by the Shanghai IC Circuit Investment Fund (state-owned), the Shanghai Jinlian Investment Development Company (pvt?), a local investment company (unknown government connection), who together own 19.21% of EDO.  Those and 14 other institutional stockholders have been holding restricted shares, which are now free to trade, representing ~24.6% of outstanding shares.
While the company indicated that it had received an increasing number of contracts for its existing facilities, it reported $151.48m in sales and a $28.37m net loss for the first quarter of this year, and indicated that it was unsure if the company would be profitable this year.  While not specific as to how the losses might break down, both a utilization rate of 70% in recent months and the cost of the new line were given as potential reasons for the possible loss this year, although the company insists that the yield rate has improved by 40% over the 2020 rate.  While Edo has a 3.3% share of the small panel OLED display market (1Q ’22), most, if not all of those units are rigid OLED displays, with an orientation toward automotive applications, where the company seems to have established itself and partnered with SAIC Motors (state), China’s largest auto producer, with whom it has developed what it calls ‘the industry’s first 12.8” vehicle grade OLED display panel.’
The pressure on EDO’s net profits is typical of relatively small OLED producers that engage in large new fab construction projects as overall production cash costs rise as utilization is low when the fab first opens, and depreciation begins.  In this case it looks like EDO is expecting utilization to remain lower than normal for some time, although they did see some improvement in May, so we assume that on an overall basis the lower utilization is the key factor limiting profitability this year, unless the phase 3 line begins ‘official’ production before the end of the year.  We assume that either the production schedule for the display developed with SAIC has yet to enter production and will be somewhat limited this year, both due to scheduling and the economic effect of the lockdowns. 
Last year, and even earlier this year a number of LCD and OLED expansion projects were initiated, particularly those looking to capitalize on IT products which had been more resistant to the panel price decreases seen for TV panels.  With Chinese COVID lockdowns causing both component and logistics issues and global inflation slowing overall demand, some of those projects have seen the push toward completion slowed, particularly those in Taiwan, where the attitude toward capacity expansion is far more conservative than in China.  Capital in China is still available for such projects, particularly OLED display fabs, so there seems to be less concern from Chinese panel producers and more acceptance that ‘things will be better’ and industry growth will continue. 
Taiwanese panel producers have considerable ‘cycle’ experience, which leads to their more conservative attitude toward capacity expansion, which Chinese producers are still competing for a place on the world stage, and while the small panel OLED display business is still in growth mode, it is now large enough that the same cycles that affect LCD display pricing will have a similar effect on OLED panel pricing, and the continued expansion of OLED capacity by Chinese producers will only exacerbate that effect.  While a slowdown of such projects would certainly benefit the OLED space on a cyclical basis, we doubt the mindset would follow that path currently as the desire to unseat incumbent South Korean OLED producers is likely the current driver, especially when you know you can still receive construction and operational subsidies from the government.

​Tianma (000050.CH) has indicated that it will be undertaking a new construction project in Wuhu City, Anhui Province.  The new facility will be a module assembly plant that is expected to cost $1.2b US in total, with an initial funding of $720m, of which 52.08% will come from Tianma ($375m) and 47.9% will come from partners including the Wuhu Industrial Investment Fund (city –Owned), and the Wuhu Jiuchuang Investment Fund (pvt).  The focus is expected to be smartphone and IT modules up to ~40” and is expected to improve Tianma’s overall profitability when completed.  No completion date was specified although we would expect between 12 and 14 months once site work has begun.
Tianma is a relatively small player in the LCD space, holding a roughly 1% share of total LCD capacity and a 0.6% share of LCD display industry revenue, but has a larger presence in the OLED space when current share is ~3.9% in the small panel OLED space, but is expected to increase to almost 7% by the end of 2024, if capacity expansion plans remain on schedule.  The company is currently building a $5.16b LCD Gen 8.5 fab in Xiamen, which would be responsible for the capacity share increase.   While the module plant does not add LCD production capacity, it is an indication that management believes that the LCD display business has decades of continuing growth, a less than sure bet in our view.
As we have noted above, while we expect LCD technology to continue to the most prevalent display technology for the next few years, Chinese panel producers seem bent on expanding what is already a majority share of that business, even if it means creating an over-capacity situation for periods of time.  What makes the LCD space more vulnerable is not competition from other regional suppliers, such as Taiwan and Korea, as expansion plans for Taiwan are small, and Korea is proceeding in the other direction, closing large panel LCD fabs, but competition amongst Chinese LCD producers themselves. 
The desire (or necessity) to produce positive results after years of government funding push Chinese panel producers to maintain high production levels, even when the market is soft, exacerbating downward pressure on panel prices, and maintain an overly optimistic view of the industry’s cyclical nature.  Some have been expanding OLED capacity, where demand continues to grow but those without the experience and expertise to produce OLED displays remain convinced that LCD technology will see increasing demand almost ad infinitum.   Capacity competition was the watchword of LCD panel producers years ago, when Chinese producers were small or even non-existent, but extended periods of over-capacity reinforced the fact that ‘If you build it, they will come’ does not always work forever.  Government funding certainly has a place when a region is trying to build an industry, but it can bring on its own problems, which are usually not seen until years later, long after those who funded the operation have moved on, leaving future local and provincial officials, company managements, and in many cases individual investors holding the bag.

Yeolight (pvt), a Chinese OLED display producer that specializes in OLED lighting has begun construction of a new Gen 4.5 OLED lighting production fab in Huaibei City, Anhui Province after receiving environmental impact approval.  The fab, which broke ground on May 20, is expected to cost a bit over $300m US.  Yeolight was spun off from Chinese OLED producer Visionozx (002387.CH) in 2015.  Visionox also spun off its PMOLED (passive matrix) business, now called Qingyue (pvt) in March of last year, along with its 2 Gen 2 8,000 sheet/month PMOLED fabs.  We have yet to see a completion date for the Yeolight fab, although we expect between 14 and 20 months to complete and begin mass production.  The new fab, when completed, is expected to be able to produce 7m OLED panels, although the size was not specified.
While OLED lighting is the most adaptive of all lighting products, the cost to produce such products remains high and has not proven to be a mass marketable product.  A number of companies are involved but LG Display closed its OLED lighting fab in 2019, while a number of other manufacturing companies, both in and outside of the display space, have tried to find ways to commercialize the production process.  OLEDWorks (pvt), Kaneka (4118.JP), Konica Minolta (4902.JP), and Lumiotec (7717.JP) ae among those producing various quantities of OLED lighting panels.  Should Yeolight build out this fab to capacity, it will be a significant contributor to OLED lighting unit volume. As long as a strong customer base can be found.
 

​There are two basic types of OLED displays.  RGB (red, green, blue) displays that are made up of pixels that contain red, green, and blue sub-pixels, and WOLED displays, which consist of blue and yellow/green layers that combine to form white light, which is then converted into reed, green, and blue sub-pixels through a color filter.  As we have noted previously, Samsung Display (pvt) has developed another type of OLED display that is based on a blue and green OLED layer that is converted into more precise red, green, and blue sub-pixels using quantum dots.  While this is a highly simplified picture of these OLED structures, there is a nuance that is quite important and that is the actual OLED materials used to create these displays.
There are two general types of OLED emitting materials, fluorescent and phosphorescent, and while those terms both encompass light-emitting materials, they are quite different.  While both materials generate light when electrically stimulated fluorescent materials generate light in a ‘singlet state’ while phosphorescent OLED materials generate light in a ‘triplet state’, and before you fall back into the glaze of Chemistry 101, the simplified explanation of what that means is phosphorescent OLED materials can emit close to 100% of the light generated, while fluorescent OLED materials can emit ~25%.  Given that the objective of all displays is to generate the most amount of light with the least amount of power, phosphorescent OLED materials are preferred, however there is a catch.
Red and green phosphorescent OLED materials are commonly used in RGB displays, however blue phosphorescent OLED materials tend to be unstable and have lifetimes that are shorter than necessary for most displays, so OLED display producers have been forced to use blue fluorescent OLED materials to fill the gap in RGB displays.  This means that the blue layer would be producing les light than its red and green phosphorescent counterparts, so OLED display designers double or triple the blue layer to balance the system.  While that works from a visual point-of-view, it requires considerably more power and is therefore an inefficient device, and many companies are working toward finding a stable phosphorescent blue OLED material to eliminate that inefficiency.
While we have read through literally hundreds of papers and IP filings that are looking for solutions to the phosphorescent blue issue, no commercial blue phosphorescent OLED emitter material has appeared in the market.  Universal Display (OLED), the holder of the IP for heavy metal red and green phosphorescent OLED emitter material, which it exclusively supplies to all OLED display manufacturers, has one of the largest blue phosphorescent material R&D programs and has stated that they expect to have a commercial blue phosphorescent OLED emitter available in 2024 while others have stated earlier goals, many of which have passed without success.  A recent article in the South Korean press indicated that Samsung Display itself was doing research toward the development of a blue phosphorescent OLED emitter which would allow the company to replace the three layers of blue fluorescent emitter material in its QD/OLED stack with one blue phosphorescent blue layer, reducing power requirements and simplifying the deposition process, but thus far we do not believe that has occurred. 
More likely would be a collaborative effort between Samsung Display and UDC toward such a product, with SDC sharing the material science behind their blue material, which is based on a platinum/carbene combination, and UDC extending the characteristics of the material to reach commercial specifications.  The SDC material has a LT70 lifetime[1] of 1,113 hours at 1,000 nits, which would be about the peak brightness of an iPhone 13 Pro Max, and the LT70 degradation would occur in roughly a year, but the press note suggests that SDC’s research has progressed considerably since the paper was written, with ‘visible results’ expected by SDC within a year from the original writing (~15 months ago).
Much of the article was speculation concerning SDC’s internal development efforts toward developing a blue phosphorescent emitter but the paper on which that speculation is based noted that the materials being developed were reactive to host materials commonly used and further development of those host materials would be necessary to take advantage of the newly developed blue phosphorescent emitter materials. This leads us to believe that a commercial blue phosphorescent emitter system is still a further away than the press article might suggest.  All in, we expect all major OLED display producers are doing at least some research toward the development of a stable blue phosphorescent OLED emitter, likely in conjunction with UDC or other OLED materials suppliers.  While progress is certainly being made in the development of such a material, the fact that new research has been published could move development forward but is only a gateway to the commercial development and production of a new material.  We keep our expectations low as many promises have been made in the past and the development of blue LEDs was far more challenging and time-consuming than its red and green cousins, so we know it will eventually be done but take all timeline assumptions with a grain of salt..


[1] LT70 means the length of time it takes for the material to lose 30% of its light output.

​Samsung Display is said to have begun placing orders for the components needed to produce its next line of foldable smartphones and has increased the unit volume expectations considerably over last year.  SDC will begin display production in June and will begin assembly in July, likely at its expanded facility in Vietnam, which has increased capacity by ~33%.  The initial component unit volume is expected to be be for between 15m and 18m units, doubling the 7m units the company produced last year, with ~70% for the Galaxy Z Flip and 30% for the Galaxy Z Fold.
Without reviewing the vast number of ‘leaks’, ‘influencer rants’, and idle speculation about what the new foldables will look like or contain hardware-wise, we expect relatively little change over last year’s models with the exception of the inclusion of a holder for the S-Pen on the Z Fold 4.  Display sizes should be almost if not exactly the same, with the possibility of some camera improvements and battery size changes, but most important will be the price, as last year Samsung was able to bring down the initial price of the Z Fold by $200. 
There has been some conjecture as to the lower profitability of the foldable line for Samsung, which is logical considering the maturity of Samsung’s flexible OLED production experience relative to its foldable production experience (although still the leader in foldable OLED), but we expect Samsung has been working toward bringing down the price for the Fold/Flip 4 line, even in an inflationary market in order to stimulate sales.  Perhaps a $200 price reduction (bringing the initial price of the Fold 4 to $1,600 from $1,800 last year) is a bit much to hope for but at least Samsung has the volumes needed to squeeze a bit more out of its foldable supply chain.
The last two foldable model years have seen announcements of the new line made in early to mid-August, which we expect will be the same this year, with release dates by the end of August or early September depending on transportation issues, but we expect this will be a more competitive year for foldables, despite Samsung’s considerable lead in the space, especially in China where Vivo (pvt) and Honor (pvt) have joined Huawei (pvt) and Oppo (pvt) with offerings this year.  There is also considerable buzz that Samsung will release a rollable smartphone device this year although we keep our expectations low for such a model this year.